The Hierarchy of Selves in Perception
Under review - [draft]
A prevalent philosophical view holds that information about the self remains implicit in perceptual representation. While it correctly describes the most basic perceptual representations, I argue that this view does not hold for more complex, but still low-level, perceptual representations of space. I propose that in the course of perceptual processing, implicit information about the self is made explicit. My discussion centers on a detailed study of egocentric reference frames. I suggest that within the perceptual system of a creature, these reference frames form a hierarchy, in which each frame that is implicit at one stage of perceptual processing is explicit at the next. This hierarchy allows implicit information about the self to be articulated as processing advances. I show how this hierarchical picture unifies standard explanations of two perceptual phenomena: gaze shifts and the illusory experience of self-motion. Furthermore, I discuss how this hierarchy of egocentric reference frames partially explains one's capacity for complex movements and informs self-locating judgments in creatures with conceptual capacities.
Under review - [draft]
A prevalent philosophical view holds that information about the self remains implicit in perceptual representation. While it correctly describes the most basic perceptual representations, I argue that this view does not hold for more complex, but still low-level, perceptual representations of space. I propose that in the course of perceptual processing, implicit information about the self is made explicit. My discussion centers on a detailed study of egocentric reference frames. I suggest that within the perceptual system of a creature, these reference frames form a hierarchy, in which each frame that is implicit at one stage of perceptual processing is explicit at the next. This hierarchy allows implicit information about the self to be articulated as processing advances. I show how this hierarchical picture unifies standard explanations of two perceptual phenomena: gaze shifts and the illusory experience of self-motion. Furthermore, I discuss how this hierarchy of egocentric reference frames partially explains one's capacity for complex movements and informs self-locating judgments in creatures with conceptual capacities.
Locating the Self: Indexicals in Perception and Action
Under review - [draft]
Our actions are guided by, and thus partially explained by, our perceptions. Accordingly, theories of perceptual content must be compatible with action explanations. It is commonly assumed that the dominant view, which holds that perceptual representations include de se (first-personal) contents, readily supports such explanations. More recently, a simpler alternative has been proposed: that perceptual representations carry merely indexical locational contents that refer to a location, that occupied by the perceiver. Proponents of this view contend that it, too, can be used in explanations of action. In this paper, I argue that both views capture something essential that the other neglects. De se contents are well-suited to explain the motivational aspect of action, while indexical locational contents can explain the coordination between perception and action. Yet taken individually, each view faces explanatory challenges. To address these, I propose the Located Individual View, which holds that perceptual representations include both de se and indexical locational contents. I contend that this hybrid account can best explain how perception both motivates and guides action.
Under review - [draft]
Our actions are guided by, and thus partially explained by, our perceptions. Accordingly, theories of perceptual content must be compatible with action explanations. It is commonly assumed that the dominant view, which holds that perceptual representations include de se (first-personal) contents, readily supports such explanations. More recently, a simpler alternative has been proposed: that perceptual representations carry merely indexical locational contents that refer to a location, that occupied by the perceiver. Proponents of this view contend that it, too, can be used in explanations of action. In this paper, I argue that both views capture something essential that the other neglects. De se contents are well-suited to explain the motivational aspect of action, while indexical locational contents can explain the coordination between perception and action. Yet taken individually, each view faces explanatory challenges. To address these, I propose the Located Individual View, which holds that perceptual representations include both de se and indexical locational contents. I contend that this hybrid account can best explain how perception both motivates and guides action.
Egocentric Reference Frames: The ‘I’ of Perception
In progress - draft available upon request
Research into the mental representation of self generally takes conceptual thoughts we have about ourselves as its paradigm. But what if the capacity to represent oneself in thought is built on low-level capacities to represent oneself in psychological systems outside of thought? I explore this possibility by arguing that egocentric reference frames - common posits in psychological explanations of exteroceptive perception - are the non-conceptual analogues of the conceptual self representation. I then reveal a point of contrast between the conceptual representation of self and its non-conceptual analogue: while the former is a constituent of one’s ‘I’-thoughts, the latter is not a constituent of one’s perceptual representations. In other words, egocentric reference frames are not represented. Rather, they are encoded in the functional architecture of one’s perceptual systems.
In progress - draft available upon request
Research into the mental representation of self generally takes conceptual thoughts we have about ourselves as its paradigm. But what if the capacity to represent oneself in thought is built on low-level capacities to represent oneself in psychological systems outside of thought? I explore this possibility by arguing that egocentric reference frames - common posits in psychological explanations of exteroceptive perception - are the non-conceptual analogues of the conceptual self representation. I then reveal a point of contrast between the conceptual representation of self and its non-conceptual analogue: while the former is a constituent of one’s ‘I’-thoughts, the latter is not a constituent of one’s perceptual representations. In other words, egocentric reference frames are not represented. Rather, they are encoded in the functional architecture of one’s perceptual systems.