The Hierarchy of Selves in Perception
Under Review - [draft]
The self’s unique role as the subject of perception suggests that the self may have special status in perceptual representation. In accordance with this intuition, a popular philosophical view of perceptual representation holds that while the objects of perception are represented, the self is not. I argue against this view. Taking into account empirical evidence as well as philosophical considerations, I demonstrate that the self is represented in perception. In fact, many representations of self are used in perception. I propose that one’s egocentric reference frames exhibit a nested structure which accounts for when and how these perceptual representations of self are used. After demonstrating how this nested structure tracks increasing degrees of agency and connects to de se thought, I conclude that the representations of self used in perception form a hierarchy.
Under Review - [draft]
The self’s unique role as the subject of perception suggests that the self may have special status in perceptual representation. In accordance with this intuition, a popular philosophical view of perceptual representation holds that while the objects of perception are represented, the self is not. I argue against this view. Taking into account empirical evidence as well as philosophical considerations, I demonstrate that the self is represented in perception. In fact, many representations of self are used in perception. I propose that one’s egocentric reference frames exhibit a nested structure which accounts for when and how these perceptual representations of self are used. After demonstrating how this nested structure tracks increasing degrees of agency and connects to de se thought, I conclude that the representations of self used in perception form a hierarchy.
Egocentric Reference Frames: The ‘I’ of Perception
In Progress
Research into the mental representation of self generally takes conceptual thoughts we have about ourselves as its paradigm. But what if the capacity to represent oneself in thought is built on low-level capacities to represent oneself in psychological systems outside of thought? I explore this possibility by arguing that egocentric reference frames - common posits in psychological explanations of exteroceptive perception - are the non-conceptual analogues of the conceptual self representation. I then reveal a point of contrast between the conceptual representation of self and its non-conceptual analogue: while the former is a constituent of one’s ‘I’-thoughts, the latter is not a constituent of one’s perceptual representations. In other words, egocentric reference frames are not represented. Rather, they are encoded in the functional architecture of one’s perceptual systems.
In Progress
Research into the mental representation of self generally takes conceptual thoughts we have about ourselves as its paradigm. But what if the capacity to represent oneself in thought is built on low-level capacities to represent oneself in psychological systems outside of thought? I explore this possibility by arguing that egocentric reference frames - common posits in psychological explanations of exteroceptive perception - are the non-conceptual analogues of the conceptual self representation. I then reveal a point of contrast between the conceptual representation of self and its non-conceptual analogue: while the former is a constituent of one’s ‘I’-thoughts, the latter is not a constituent of one’s perceptual representations. In other words, egocentric reference frames are not represented. Rather, they are encoded in the functional architecture of one’s perceptual systems.